We explore the incentives of a vertically integrated incumbent …rm to license the production technology of its core input to an external …rm. We …nd that it opts for licensing even when licensing induces the entry of the licensee in the …nal goods market.
Introduction
How does input pricing a¤ect the licensing incentives? What are the welfare implications of vertical licensing? In this paper, we attempt to address these questions.
To this end, we consider a framework in which two incumbent …rms produce two competing …nal goods using an input that they initially produce in-house. One of the incumbents considers licensing its input technology to an external …rm for a …xed licensing fee. Once the licensing agreement is signed, the licensor can source the input from the licensee after bargaining over the terms of a two-part tari¤ contract. Moreover, once the licensing agreement is signed, the licensee can enter into the …nal goods market and compete with the two incumbents. We assume that competition in the …nal goods market takes place in quantities and examine what happens when the licensee does not enter into the …nal goods market -the 'no entry case'as well as when it enters -the 'entry case'.
We …nd that independently of whether the licensee enters into the …nal goods market or not, the incumbent always opts for licensing. The driving force of licensing, however, di¤ers substantially among the entry and the no entry case. In the no entry case, licensing is mainly due to e¢ ciency reasons: when the incumbent licenses its input technology, it becomes more e¢ cient and, thus, enjoys a larger competitive advantage in the …nal goods market. The higher e¢ ciency of the licensor is not due to a cost advantage of the licensee.
It is due, instead, to input pricing. Speci…cally, in the no entry case, the licensee sets an wholesale price which is below the input's marginal cost. We refer to this as the input pricing e¤ ect of licensing. The licensee has incentives to do so because it can extract part of the resulting higher pro…ts of the licensor through the …xed fee included in the two-part tari¤. In fact, due to the higher e¢ ciency under licensing, the incumbent is willing to license its input technology even for free when bargaining power is su¢ ciently high.
In the entry case, licensing results in an increase in the number of downstream competitors and, thus, in an increase in the intensity of competition. We refer to this as the competition intensity e¤ ect of licensing. The licensee now does not subsidize the licensor -it sets a wholesale price that exceeds the input's marginal cost, decreasing the e¢ ciency of the licensor but alleviating the negative impact of the competition intensity e¤ ect. Furthermore, licensing gives rise to two additional e¤ects. First, the market expansion e¤ ect, which refers to the fact that licensing, through entry, increases the product variety and, in turn, expands the demand in the …nal goods market. And second, the business stealing e¤ ect: when the licensee enters into the …nal goods market, it "steals" a part of the sales and market share of the licensor's rival. These two e¤ects work in favor of licensing. They outweigh the decreased e¢ ciency and the increased competition intensity and lead to its emergence in equilibrium.
Importantly, the entry of the licensee into the …nal goods market, although it intensi…es the market competition and reduces the e¢ ciency of the licensor, it strengthens, instead of weakens, the licensing incentives. In other words, the incumbent has stronger licensing incentives when the licensee becomes its direct competitor in the …nal goods market, since the business stealing e¤ ect along with the market expansion e¤ ect and the inverse input pricing e¤ ect augment the licensor's pro…ts and make entry desirable. Mankiw and Whinston (1986) , similar to us, show that a …rm through its entry in the …nal goods market "steals"business from the incumbent …rms and increases product variety, leading to higher demand and higher consumers' and total welfare. Although this is the case, Mankiw and Whinston (1986) show that the …rm cannot capture the resulting larger pie. In contrast, we show when …rms are involved in vertical licensing, they can use their vertical trading contract as an instrument that allows them to behave in a pro-collusive way and in turn they can take full advantage of the larger pie. Clearly, this works as an additional motive for licensing.
Vertical licensing turns out to be desirable not only for the licensor, but also for the consumers and the economy as a whole. This holds both with and without entry of the licensee in the …nal goods market. Intuitively, licensing results in lower …nal prices, and thus, in higher consumers'surplus, either because it enhances the e¢ ciency of the licensor (in the no entry case) or because it intensi…es market competition (in the entry case). In fact, in the entry case, licensing is even more desirable due to the increased product variety and competition.
We also examine the implications of licensing with and without entry in various extensions of the main model. We …nd that entry reinforces licensing incentives when the licensor and the licensee trade through a wholesale price contract and when the licensor is initially a monopolist in the …nal goods market. Furthermore, we show that, in case of entry, after the signing of the licensing agreement when the licensor's rival also sources its input from the licensee or when the licensor has a cost advantage compared to its rival, the licensing incentives are even stronger. Examining what happens when licensing takes place through a per-unit of output royalty, instead of through a …xed licensing fee, licensing incentives occur only for free and only in the no entry case if the bargaining power of the licensor is su¢ ciently high. 3 Our work is related to the vast theoretical literature on technology licensing. This literature has analyzed various aspects of licensing such as, the choice among royalties and licensing fees (e.g., Kamien and Tauman, 1986 , Muto, 1993 , Wang, 1998 , the impact of licensing on innovation (e.g., Gallini and Winter, 1985) , the role of information asymmetries (e.g., Wright, 1990, Beggs, 1992) , and the choice among merger and licensing (e.g., Fauli-Oller and Sandonis, 2003) . The majority of this literature has done so assuming that the licensor and the licensee(s) operate in the same one-tier market or that the licensor is not active in the market (it is an outsider). Some recent exceptions include the papers of Mukherjee (2003) , Arya and Mittendorf (2006) , Mukherjee and Ray (2007) , Rey and Salant (2012) , which, similar to us, have examined licensing within a vertically related market. The latter papers, however, di¤er from ours in three important aspects. First, most of them have considered licensing either among downstream or upstream …rms, and not among vertically related …rms. 4 Second, some of them have analyzed settings in which, after the signing of the licensing agreement, the licensor is not a customer of the licensee. Third, they have examined the possibility that the licensing triggers the entry of a new …rm into the market, but not the entry of the licensee into the licensor's market. In this respect, our paper complements the existing literature on technology licensing and, in contrast to the existing ones, is more appropriate for the analysis of situations such as the ones described above (e.g., Boeing case).
Our paper is also related to the literature on outsourcing. A number of papers within this literature (e.g., Pack and Saggi, 2001 , Shy and Stenbacka, 2003 , Sappington 2005 , Arya et al., 2008a and 2008b , Lim and Tan, 2010 have analyzed a …nal product manufacturer's 'make-or-buy' decision. That is, its choice among input production in-house and input sourcing from an external …rm -outsourcing. 5 Some of these papers have assumed that the input production is outsourced to an already existing vertically integrated rival. Others, instead, have assumed that it is outsourced to an independent upstream …rm. In particular, 3 It should be noted that free licensing is observed quite often. It is observed in the market for open source software as well as in other markets. For instance, in January 2015, Toyota announced that it would make more than 5,600 patents on fuel-cell technologies available for use, free of royalty payments, to a wide array of companies in the transportation sector. For more on this, see e.g. Toyota O¤ers To License Hydrogen Fuel-Cell Patents, For Free, Green Car Reports (January 5, 2015) , and Toyota To Share Hydrogen Fuel Cell Patents, Forbes (January 5, 2015) . 4 An exception in this respect is the paper of Rey and Salant (2012) which considers vertical licensing. 5 The practice of outsourcing is obviously quite similar to the practice of licensing especially when licensing does not involve fees or royalties. Pack and Saggi (2001) and Goh (2005) have examined a buyer's incentives to outsource its technology to a supplier. In the former paper, technology di¤usion can result in a new downstream entry while in the latter can result in upstream entry. Both papers have found that the new entry can be bene…cial for the two original …rms engaged in technology transfer because the input tends to marginal cost. In contrast to these papers, we consider the entry of the upstream …rm to which the input production is outsourced and we show that licensing is bene…cial even when input price is greater than the marginal cost. Lim and Tan (2010) consider a setting in which the supplier becomes a direct competitor of the buyer after the latter's outsourcing. However, they focus on the buyer's rate of learning and brand equity, while we demonstrate the role of the endogenous input pricing on licensing decision.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we describe our main model. In section 3, we examine the licensing incentives in both the no entry case and the entry case, and we characterize the impact of entry on these incentives. In the following section, we evaluate the welfare implications of vertical licensing. In Section 5, we examine the robustness of our main …ndings when under licensing both incumbent …rms source the input from the licensee. In Section 6, we discuss a number of other extensions of our main model. Finally, in Section 7, we conclude. All the proofs are included in Appendix B.
The Model
We consider a market consisting initially of two …rms, …rm 1 and …rm 2. Each …rm i, with i = 1; 2, produces a di¤erentiated …nal good using, in a one-to-one proportion, a core input that it produces in-house at marginal cost c > 0.
Both …rms hold a patent for their input production technologies. One of them, without loss of generality …rm 1, considers licensing its input technology to an external …rm, …rm S, for a …xed licensing fee, F 0. 6 After the licensing agreement has been signed, the licensee (…rm S) is in the position to produce the licensor's (…rm 1's) patented input. It can produce the input at the same cost as the licensor, i.e., at c. 7
The knowledge that licensing provides regarding the production of the …nal good's core input can allow …rm S to produce the …nal good too. Thus, licensing can cause …rm S's 6 In Section 6, we discuss what happens when licensing takes place through a variable royalty instead and show that the licensor prefers using a …xed licensing fee. 7 We abstract from assuming that …rm S is more e¢ cient in input production than …rm 1 since the incentives for vertical licensing would be straightforward then. entry into the …nal goods market. In what follows, we consider two cases, the 'entry case' in which …rm S enters into the …nal goods market and the 'no entry'case in which it stays out of it. 8 In both cases, we assume that under licensing, …rm 1 stops producing the input in-house and sources it from …rm S. The input sourcing terms include the terms of a twopart tari¤, i.e., a …xed fee, T , and a wholesale price per unit of input, w, that …rm 1 pays to …rm S. These terms are determined through Nash bargaining, in which the bargaining power of …rm S and …rm 1 is given by and 1 , respectively, with 0 < < 1: 9 ' 10
The (inverse) demand function for …rm i's …nal good is:
where p i and q i are the price and the quantity of …rm i's …nal good, respectively, and Q i is the quantity of its rival(s)'…nal goods. In particular, Q i = q j , with i; j = 1; 2 and i 6 = j, in the no entry case, while Q i = q j + q k , with i; j; k = 1; 2; S and i 6 = j 6 = k, in the entry case. The parameter measures the degree of product di¤erentiation; namely, the higher is, the closer substitutes the …nal goods are.
The timing of moves is as follows. First, …rm 1 decides whether to license its input technology to …rm S. In case of licensing, it sets the licensing fee F and, in turn, …rm S signs or not the licensing agreement. If the agreement is signed, in the following stage, …rm 1 and …rm S negotiate over (w; T ). In the last stage, …rm 1 and …rm 2, as well as …rm S in the case of licensing and entry, choose their quantities simultaneously and separately. 11
We solve for the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of this game.
We make the following assumption throughout the paper in order to guarantee that all the …rms face a non-negative marginal cost in all the cases under consideration:
We start our analysis with the benchmark case in which there is no licensing. In the absence of licensing, …rm 1 and …rm 2 compete among them in the standard Cournot way.
In particular, each …rm i chooses its output in order to maximize its pro…ts: i (q i ; q j ) = (a q i q j )q i cq i , with i; j = 1; 2 and i 6 = j. Solving the resulting system of …rst order conditions, we obtain the Cournot-Nash equilibrium quantities, q B 1 and q B 2 , and the respective equilibrium pro…ts, B 1 and B 2 , included in Table 1 of Appendix A.
Licensing Incentives
In this section, we analyze the licensing incentives with and without entry of the licensee into the …nal goods market and examine how they are in ‡uenced by entry.
Licensing and No Entry
We start with the analysis of the case in which the licensing agreement has been signed and …rm S has stayed out of the …nal goods market.
In the last stage, …rm 2 faces the same maximization problem as in the benchmark case.
Its competitor, …rm 1, chooses q 1 in order to maximize it own (gross from T and F ) pro…ts:
1 (q 1 ; q 2 ; w) = (a q 1 q 2 )q 1 wq 1 . Solving the system of the …rst order conditions, we derive the equilibrium quantities in terms of w:
Obviously, a decrease in the wholesale price results in higher output for …rm 1 and lower output for …rm 2.
In the following stage, …rm S and …rm 1 negotiate over (w, T ). In particular, they solve the following generalized Nash bargaining problem:
where S (w) = (w c)q 1 (w) are …rm S's pro…ts and 1 (w) = 1 (q 1 (w); q 2 (w); w). Note that the disagreement payo¤s of both …rms are equal to zero since neither …rm has an outside option. Maximizing (2) with respect to T , we …nd:
Using (3), the gross (from F ) pro…ts of …rm S and …rm 1 can be rewritten as:
Substituting the above into (2), we obtain an expression which is proportional to the joint pro…ts of …rm S and …rm 1. It follows that w is chosen to maximize these pro…ts:
From the …rst order condition of (5), we obtain the equilibrium wholesale price and, after substituting it into (3), we also obtain the equilibrium …xed fee:
One can easily check that w LN < c. That is, …rm S subsidizes, through the wholesale price, the production of its customer, …rm 1. 12 As we saw above, by charging a lower wholesale price, …rm S increases the aggressiveness of …rm 1 in the …nal goods market and enhances its output at the expense of …rm 2's output. Firm S has incentives to do so because it can use, in turn, the …xed fee T in order to capture part of the resulting higher …rm 1's pro…ts. 13 Clearly, the higher is …rm S's bargaining power, the larger is the share of …rm 1's pro…ts that it captures through T .
The licensing fee is determined in the following way: …rm 1 knows that …rm S will reject the licensing agreement if and only if its pro…ts without the agreement exceed its pro…ts with the agreement. Since the former pro…ts are equal to 0, it follows that …rm 1 will optimally set F LN = S (w LN ) + T LN . As a result, …rm 1's net equilibrium pro…ts in the licensing and no entry case are:
Therefore, …rm 1 enjoys not only the pro…ts from its own sales in the …nal goods market but also …rm S's pro…ts from the input sales, i.e., it enjoys all of its joint pro…ts with …rm 1 2 Assumption 1 guarantees that w LN > 0. 1 3 A similar rationale exists in the delegation literature (e.g., Vickers, 1985 , Fershtmam and Judd, 1987 , Sklivas, 1987 Proposition 1 When …rm S does not enter into the …nal goods market, …rm 1 always has incentives to license its input technology.
As Proposition 1 informs us, …rm 1 always licenses its input technology to …rm S when the latter does not enter into the …nal goods market. It is important to note that this holds not only when …rm 1 charges a positive …xed fee for the licensing agreement, but also when it o¤ers the licensing agreement for free (F = 0), as long as its bargaining power is su¢ ciently high. This is stated formally in the following Corollary.
Corollary 1 When …rm S does not enter into the …nal goods market and licensing is for free (F = 0), …rm 1 has incentives to license its input technology if and only if is su¢ ciently low.
Why does …rm 1 have incentives to transfer its input technology to …rm S even for free? Recall that when …rm 1 produces the input in-house, it faces marginal cost c. When, instead, it licenses its input technology, it faces a lower marginal cost w LN < c. We refer to the cost reduction that …rm 1 enjoys through the input price as the input pricing e¤ ect of licensing. It follows that due to the input pricing e¤ ect, licensing results in an increase in …rm 1's e¢ ciency; hence, in a cost advantage for …rm 1 in the …nal goods market. A straightforward implication of this is that the gross from T LN pro…ts of …rm 1 are larger under licensing. When …rm S's bargaining power is not too large, …rm S obtains only a small share of these pro…ts through T LN . As a consequence, …rm 1 is willing, then, to license its input technology even for free. Clearly, when a licensing fee is used and …rm 1 fully enjoys its own pro…ts from the …nal goods market, licensing incentives are always present independently of the bargaining power distribution. 14 The above result is in accordance with a result of the literature on vertical separation, according to which vertical separation and, thus, external input sourcing can be preferred to vertical integration for strategic reasons. In particular, a number of papers within this literature (e.g., Vickers, 1985 , Jansen, 2003 demonstrate that in settings with downstream quantity competition (strategic substitutability), a vertically separated upstream …rm sets the wholesale price below marginal cost in order to increase its downstream customer's e¢ ciency and pro…ts and extract the latter through the …xed fee. This mechanism obviously coincides with the one that we have identi…ed above. The main di¤erence is that in our setting, licensing allows the downstream, and not the upstream, vertically separated …rm to extract the pro…ts at the end.
Licensing and Entry
We turn now to the examination of the case in which the licensing agreement has been signed and …rm S has entered into the …nal goods market.
In the last stage of the game, …rms 1, 2, and S choose their outputs in order to maximize their respective pro…ts:
2 (q 1 ; q 2 ; q S ; w) = (a q 2 q 1 q S )q 2 cq 2 ; (8)
Solving the system of the …rst order conditions, we …nd:
In the second stage, …rm S and …rm 1 solve the following maximization problem:
where 1 (w) and S (w) are found after substituting (10) and (11) into (7) and (9), respectively. It is important to note that while the disagreement payo¤ of …rm 1 continues to be null, the same does not longer hold for …rm S's disagreement payo¤. This is so because …rm S now has an outside option in its bargaining with …rm 1: in case of disagreement, …rm S can still have pro…ts from its own sales in the …nal goods market. In particular, its disagreement payo¤ is given by
Maximizing (12) with respect to T , we obtain:
Using the above expression, we …nd the following:
Substituting in turn (14) and (15) into (12), we note that the latter reduces to an expression proportional to the joint pro…ts of …rm S and …rm 1 minus …rm S's disagreement payo¤.
The wholesale price that maximizes this expression is:
It can be con…rmed that w LE > c. In other words, in contrast to the no entry case, when …rm S enters into the …nal goods market, it does not subsidize …rm 1; there is an inverse input pricing e¤ ect in place. Why is that? Initially, one might think that this result is driven by …rm S's incentive to "raise rival's cost" in order to increase its own market share in the …nal goods market. However, this is not so here. As we saw above, the wholesale price is chosen in order to maximize the joint pro…ts of …rm S and …rm 1 and not the pro…ts of …rm S alone. Essentially, the two …rms manage to behave as a multi-product …rm through the setting of the wholesale price. But why their joints pro…ts are higher when the wholesale price exceeds the marginal cost? Firm S's entry into the …nal goods market intensi…es downstream competition. We refer to this as the competition intensity e¤ ect.
The two …rms alleviate the negative impact of the competition intensity e¤ ect on their joint pro…ts through the setting of a higher wholesale price that leads in turn into a lower joint output. In other words, the two …rms set the wholesale price in a pro-collusive way.
It remains to determine the presence or absence of licensing incentives in the …rst stage of the game. We can obtain the equilibrium …xed fee T LE after substituting (16) into (13) and, in turn, substituting the resulting T LE and w LE into (14) and (15), we can also obtain the gross from the licensing fee equilibrium pro…ts of …rm 1 and …rm S. For the same reasons as the ones explained in subsection 3.1, …rm 1 extracts, through the licensing fee, the pro…ts of …rm S: F LE = S (w LE ) + T LE . Therefore, …rm 1's net equilibrium pro…ts (included in Table 2 of Appendix A) in the licensing and entry case are:
Comparing LE 1 with B 1 , we …nd that …rm 1 has incentives to license its input technology even when licensing reinforces competition.
Proposition 2 When …rm S enters into the …nal goods market, …rm 1 always has incentives to license its input technology.
The intuition is as follows. As mentioned above, licensing, when it is accompanied by entry, gives rise to the competition intensity e¤ ect and the inverse input pricing e¤ ect. These e¤ects clearly have a negative impact on the pro…ts that …rm 1 obtains from its own sales in the …nal goods market. Hence, if licensing was for free, …rm 1 would never opt for licensing in the entry case. Besides though the competition intensity e¤ ect and the inverse input pricing e¤ ect, when licensing triggers entry, it also brings about a business stealing e¤ ect and a market expansion e¤ ect. The former refers to the fact that …rm 2's output falls as the number of …rms in the market increases. Thus, when …rm S enters into the …nal goods market, it "steals"part of the sales and market share of …rm 1's rival. The market expansion e¤ ect refers instead to the fact that the entry of …rm S corresponds to an increase in the number of di¤erentiated …nal products and, thus, to an increase in product variety that in turn expands the demand in the …nal goods market. 15 Both of these e¤ects augment the joint pro…ts of …rm S and …rm 1 that the licensor enjoys, making licensing pro…table even when it intensi…es competition. An important observation is that the incentives for vertical licensing can be stronger than the incentives for horizontal licensing. In particular, consider the case of horizontal licensing in which …rm 1 and …rm 2 operate in an one-tier market and …rm 1 licenses its production technology to an independent …rm which enters into this one-tier market. In such a case, licensing would give rise again to the competition intensity e¤ ect, the business stealing e¤ ect and the market expansion e¤ ect that we identify here. This is also shown 1 5 The market expansion e¤ ect appears to be present in the licensing case between Boeing and Mitsubishi. The latter is about to introduce the Mitsubishi Regional Jet (MRJ) -a new and di¤erentiated product in the market for short-haul passenger aircrafts known as "regional jets". In particular, the MRJ will come in versions seating roughly 70-90 passengers, while Boeing and Airbus' aircrafts seat over 100 passengers. Demand for regional jets has picked up after the MRJ made its maiden ‡ight in November 2015. In fact, Mitsubishi already has 243 orders and 204 options for these jets. According to an article on the press ("Mitsubishi Aims for the Sky After Jet Takes O¤", The Wall Street Journal, November 11, 2015) "... estimates that carriers will order 4,360 regional jets through 2034 and it is predicted that Mitsubishi will capture 27% of that market."For more on this see e.g., "Can Mitsubishi Heavy Industries'MRJ Regional Jet Lift It To A 'Buy'?", Forbes (October 20, 2014), "Japanese Planemaker in Talks for Major Deal", Financial Tribune (July 13, 2016).
by Mankiw and Whinston (1986) where a new entrant in the …nal goods market "steals" business from the incumbent …rms and increases product variety. However, in an one-tier market, the entry does not give rise to the inverse input pricing e¤ ect, and thus the entrant cannot capture part of the greater demand and welfare. So, in case of horizontal licensing and entry, the lack of the inverse input pricing e¤ ect does not allow the licensor and the licensee to alleviate the negative impact of the competition intensity e¤ ect -and thus, to behave in a pro-collusive way. Therefore, the vertical contract -input pricing -can constitute an instrument that allows the …rms involved in licensing to behave in a pro-collusive way, strengthening their licensing incentives.
The Impact of Entry
Having explored the incentives for licensing both with and without entry, we are now able to characterize the impact that entry has on them.
Proposition 3 The entry of …rm S into the …nal goods market reinforces …rm 1's licensing incentives.
Interestingly, the entry of the licensee into direct competition with the licensor has a positive instead of a negative impact on the licensing incentives. Why is that? The entry of the licensee into the …nal goods market increases the intensity of competition faced by the licensor. This -the competition intensity e¤ ect -is clearly a negative e¤ect for the licensor.
At the same time though, the entry allows …rm 1 to steal away market share from its rival -…rm 2 -as well as to enjoy a larger market size. These e¤ects -the business stealing e¤ ect and the market expansion e¤ ect -augment …rm 1's pro…ts and along with the entry's inverse input pricing e¤ ect which mitigates the negative impact of the competition intensity e¤ ect, render entry desirable.
Entry does not only alter the licensing incentives, as Proposition 4 states below, it also alters the impact that product di¤erentiation has on them.
Proposition 4 An increase in product di¤ erentiation has a negative impact on the licensing incentives when …rm S does not enter into the …nal goods market and a positive one when it enters.
In the no entry case, the higher is product di¤erentiation, the higher is the equilibrium wholesale price and, thus, the smaller is the subsidy that …rm S o¤ers to …rm 1. In other words, the weaker is the competition in the …nal goods market, the lower are the incentives of …rm S to enhance the competitive position of its customer by decreasing the latter's variable cost and, thus, the smaller is the e¢ ciency enhancement that …rm 1 enjoys. As a result, …rm 1 has stronger incentives to license its technology when product di¤erentiation decreases.
In the entry case, instead, a decrease in product di¤erentiation has two negative implications for the licensor: it enhances the competition intensity e¤ ect and it weakens the market expansion e¤ ect. In fact, in the entry case, the relationship between the equilibrium wholesale price and product di¤erentiation is U-shaped: @w LE =@ < 0 if and only if 0:43792. Intuitively, an increase in the wholesale price decreases the negative impact of the competition intensity e¤ ect. When, however, the competition in the …nal goods market is already too …erce, a (further) increase in the wholesale price is avoided because it can result in the market foreclosure of …rm 1. 16 In light of these, it is not surprising that when the licensee enters into the …nal goods market, licensing incentives get weaker when product di¤erentiation decreases.
Therefore, when the licensee stays out of the licensor's market, it is more likely to observe licensing in markets with less di¤erentiated products. While, when the licensee enters into the …nal goods market, licensing is more likely to occur in markets with more di¤erentiated …nal products. 17 Overall, the impact of entry on the licensing incentives is weaker in markets in which …nal products are not too di¤erentiated.
Welfare Implications of Vertical Licensing
We have already seen that vertical licensing is desirable for …rm 1. Next, we examine whether vertical licensing is also desirable from a welfare point of view.
Proposition 5 Vertical licensing both with and without the entry of …rm S into the …nal goods market always has a positive impact on consumers' surplus and on total welfare. Its impact is larger with entry than without entry.
1 6 For a review of the market foreclosure issues that arise in the presence of vertical integration see Rey and Tirole (2007) .
1 7 In the extreme case in which the …nal goods tend to be homogeneous, …rm 1 is indi¤erent between entry and no entry. The market expansion e¤ ect is absent then and the competition intensity e¤ ect along with the business stealing e¤ ect cancel out with the input pricing e¤ ect.
Vertical licensing is bene…cial both for the consumers and for the economy as a whole.
Intuitively, the positive impact of licensing on consumers'surplus is due to the increase in …rm 1's e¢ ciency under no entry and to the increase in product variety and competition intensity under entry. The positive impact of licensing on overall welfare is driven by its positive impact on consumers'surplus and on the licensor's pro…ts (Propositions 1 and 2) that outweigh its negative impact on …rm 2's pro…ts. In fact, vertical licensing is even more desirable from a welfare viewpoint when it triggers entry into the …nal goods market than when it does not. Intuitively, under entry, even though …rm 1 is less e¢ cient, market competition is …ercer and the market is larger.
Recently, the EU and the US both revised their rules for the assessment of technology licensing agreements under respectively the EU competition law and the US antitrust law.
The new regulations continue to re ‡ect the view that licensing, by facilitating the di¤usion of technology, is in most cases pro-competitive. Based on this view, a block exemption applies to all the licensing agreements between …rms that have limited market shares. 18 Our analysis points out a novel channel through which licensing can be pro-competitive even in cases in which the licensors have large market shares. 19 In particular, it points out that vertical licensing, by triggering entry into more than one stages of the vertical chain, it can also generate more intense product market competition.
Common Input Supplier
We have assumed throughout our analysis that …rm 2 produces its input in-house both with and without licensing. We alter this assumption now and assume that after the licensing agreement has been signed, …rm 2 also sources its input from …rm S. A consequence of this is that the bargaining game over the contract terms that takes place under licensing in stage two di¤ers from the respective one in our main model. In particular, …rm S now bargains with two, instead of one, …rms. In modeling the multilateral bargaining game, we invoke the Nash equilibrium of simultaneous generalized Nash bargaining games, in which the bargaining power of …rm S and each …rm i, with i = 1; 2, continues to be given by and 1 , respectively. Thus, during the negotiations between …rm S and …rm i, each of them takes as given the outcome of the simultaneously-run negotiations of …rm S and …rm j, with i; j = 1; 2 and i 6 = j: A key assumption that underlies this modeling approach is that …rm S bargains with each …rm i simultaneously and separately. 20 In order to avoid the multiple equilibria that can arise in such a setting due to the multiplicity of the beliefs that the downstream …rms can form when they receive out-of-equilibrium o¤ers, we impose pairwise proofness on the equilibrium contracts (e.g., Horn and Wolinsky, 1988 , O'Brien and Sha¤er, 1992 , Milliou and Petrakis, 2007 , Alipranti et al., 2014 . That is, we require that a contract between …rm S and …rm i is immune to a bilateral deviation of …rm S with …rm j. Moreover, in order to ensure that all the …rms face a non-negative marginal cost in all the cases under consideration, we assume that a < 3c.
In the no entry case, since in the bargaining game over the contract terms …rm S bargains with two …rms, it now has an outside option: the pro…ts that it would make when one of the downstream …rms acts as monopolist facing the equilibrium contract terms. The resulting equilibrium wholesale prices, with i = 1; 2, are: 21
We observe that w CN i < c. That is, similarly to our main model, we …nd that, in the no entry case, …rm S subsidizes the …nal good producers via the wholesale prices. In fact, it subsidizes the downstream production now more. The reason for the subsidization di¤ers from the one in our main model. The subsidization here is due to the "commitment problem" faced by the upstream monopolist, …rm S. That is, it is due to the fact that when …rm S trades with …rm i, it cannot commit that it will not o¤er better trading terms to …rm j. 22 An important implication of this is that the gross from the licensing fee pro…ts of …rm S are negative when
4 2 2 2 + 3 , with @ ( ) @ > 0, (1) = 1 and (0) = 0, i.e., when either products are too close substitutes or when products are su¢ ciently close substitutes and …rm S's 2 0 This assumption is standard in situations with multilateral contracting (see e.g., Cremer and Riordan, 1987 , Horn and Wolinsky, 1988 , Hart and Tirole, 1990 , O'Brien and Sha¤er, 1992 , McAfee and Schwartz, 1994 and 1995 , Rey and Verge, 2004 , Milliou and Petrakis, 2007 , Alipranti et al., 2014 bargaining power is su¢ ciently low. This is so because, when products are close substitutes and, thus, downstream competition is …erce, …rm S's incentives to behave opportunistic are strong; hence, its"commitment problem" is severe. Given this, when < ( ), …rm 1 has to o¤er a negative licensing fee to …rm S; it has to pay for the licensing agreement.
Respectively, in the entry case, …rm S's outside option also di¤ers from the one in our main model. Speci…cally, its outside option now includes not only its pro…ts from its own sales in the …nal goods market, but also its pro…ts from its input sales, at the equilibrium wholesale price, to …rm i, with i = 1; 2. This results in the following equilibrium wholesale prices:
As in the entry case of the main model, we observe that w CE > c. Given though that now, …rm 1, …rm S and …rm 2 can behave, through the setting of the wholesale price, as a multi-product monopolist, the equilibrium wholesale price exceeds the one in our main model in which only …rm 1 and …rm S could behave as a multi-product …rm.
Proposition 6 When both …rm 1 and …rm 2 source the input from …rm S under licensing, (i) in the no entry case, …rm 1 has incentives to license its input technology if and only if < 0:891638 and > 1 ( ), with 1 > 0, 1 (0:891638) = 1 and 1 (0) = 0, and 1 ( ) > ( ) for all values of , (ii) in the entry case, …rm 1 always has incentives to license its input technology, (iii) entry always reinforces …rm 1's licensing incentives, (iv) licensing always has a positive impact on consumers' surplus and on total welfare and its positive impact is higher with entry than without entry if and only if products are su¢ ciently di¤ erentiated.
Proposition 6(i) informs us that when both …rms 1 and 2 source the input from …rm S in the licensing and no entry case, …rm 1 licenses its input technology only when the …nal products are not too close substitutes and the bargaining power of …rm S is su¢ ciently high. This clearly contrasts with what happens when only …rm 1 sources the input from …rm S under licensing, where, as we saw in Proposition 1, …rm 1 always licenses its input technology. This di¤erence is due to the fact that, as we mentioned above, in the case of the common input supplier, if either products are too close substitutes or products are su¢ ciently close substitutes and …rm S's bargaining power is su¢ ciently low, …rm 1 has to pay …rm S for the licensing agreement. Moreover, when products are su¢ ciently close substitutes, both …rms 1 and 2 enjoy great subsidization under licensing.
According to Proposition 6(ii), in the entry case, …rm 1 always opts for licensing when it shares its input supplier with its rival. This happens because, similarly to the main model, …rst, the setting of a higher wholesale price decreases the negative impact of competition intensity e¤ ect and, second, the entry of …rm S into the …nal goods market gives rise to both the market expansion e¤ ect and the business stealing e¤ ect.
As Proposition 6(iii) informs us, the entry of …rm S into the …nal goods market has again a positive impact on the licensing incentives. This is again due to the market expansion e¤ ect and the business stealing e¤ ect which increase …rm 1's pro…ts as well as due to the inverse input pricing e¤ ect which mitigates the negative impact of competition intensity e¤ ect.
In the common input supplier case too, licensing is welfare-enhancing in the no entry case due to input pricing e¤ ect and in the entry case due to market expansion e¤ ect. However, now licensing with entry is bene…cial both for the consumers and total welfare relative to licensing without entry if and only if product di¤erentiation is su¢ ciently high. This is so, because in the entry case when product di¤erentiation is low, the market expansion e¤ ect is weak and"thus it does not outweight the lower e¢ ciency of both …rm 1 and …rm 2 due to the higher wholesale prices under entry.
Corollary 2 (i) In the no entry case, …rm 1's licensing incentives are stronger when both …rm 1 and …rm 2 source the input from …rm S under licensing than when only …rm 1 sources the input from …rm S if and only if < 0:881239 and > 2 ( ), with 2 > 0, 2 (0:881239) = 1 and 2 (0) = 0.
(ii) In the entry case, …rm 1's licensing incentives are stronger when both …rm 1 and …rm 2 source the input from …rm S under licensing than when only …rm 1 sources the input from …rm S.
In the no entry case, …rm 1 can have stronger licensing incentives when both …rm 1 and …rm 2 source the input from …rm S than when only …rm 1 sources the input from …rm S.
This holds when products are not close substitutes or when products are su¢ ciently close substitutes and …rm S's bargaining power is su¢ ciently high. Intuitively, when both …rms source their inputs from …rm S, not only …rm 1 but also …rm 2 bene…ts from the input pricing e¤ ect. Firm 1, in turn, extracts a share of the increased pro…ts of …rm 2 via the …xed licensing fee. When, however, the products are close substitutes, …rm 1 has to pay …rm S for the licensing agreement. This fact along with …rm 2's greater e¢ ciency weaken then …rm 1's licensing incentives.
In the entry case, …rm 1 always has stronger licensing incentives when both …rms 1 and 2 source the input from …rm S than when only …rm 1 sources the input from …rm S. This happens because when both …rms share their input supplier, then all the …rms in the market manage to behave as a multi-product monopolist. When instead …rm 1 alone sources the input from …rm S, only …rms 1 and S can behave as a multiproduct …rm competing with …rm 2. Thus, the competition intensity e¤ ect is weaker in the common input supplier case.
Moreover, the business stealing e¤ ect is greater then: …rm 2 loses a greater part of its market share that in turn increases …rm S's market share even more in the common input supplier case. The greater business stealing e¤ ect is due to the greater inverse input pricing e¤ect.
Finally, in the no entry case, both the consumers'welfare and total welfare are greater when both …rms 1 and 2 source the input from …rm S than when only …rm 1 sources the input from …rm S. This is due to the greater input pricing e¤ ect that occurs in the former case and, thus, to the fact that both …rms enjoy higher e¢ ciency. However, in the entry case, when both …rm 1 and …rm 2 source the input from …rm S, the greater inverse input pricing e¤ ect along with the weaker market expansion e¤ ect, have as a result the consumers' surplus and the total welfare to be lower than the respective ones when only …rm 1 sources the input from …rm S.
Extensions -Discussion
In this section, we discuss brie ‡y a number of further extensions of our main model to extract some additional insights.
(i) Wholesale Price Contract
In our main model, we have assumed that input trading occurs through a two-par tari¤. We consider here what would happen if, instead, it occurred through a wholesale price contract.
For simpli…cation reasons, we assume that …rm S makes a take-it-or-leave-it o¤er to …rm 1 regarding w; i.e., there is no bargaining. 23 Our main conclusion is included in the following Proposition.
2 3 As we discuss later on, the inclusion of bargaining would not a¤ect our main results.
Proposition 7 When vertical trading takes place through a wholesale price contract, …rm 1 has incentives to license its input technology if and only if …rm S enters into the …nal goods market.
When …rms trade through a wholesale price contract, licensing does not arise in equilibrium when it is not accompanied by entry. Intuitively, under trading through a wholesale price contract, …rm S is not in position to extract part of …rm 1's pro…ts through the …xed fee and there is double marginalization both with and without entry, b w LN > c and b w LE > c.
Therefore, under trading through a wholesale price, there is a inverse input pricing e¤ ect in the no entry case too. As a result, the licensor is less e¢ cient with licensing. Its lower e¢ ciency translates into lower pro…ts with licensing in the no entry case. The licensing incentives are restored when a licensing fee is optimally charged and entry occurs mainly because of the market expansion e¤ ect which is in place under a wholesale price contract too. 24 In fact, the market expansion e¤ ect results also in a greater consumer and total welfare under licensing with entry than under no licensing.
On the basis of the above, we can draw two conclusions. First, the contract type used in input trading can be crucial for the licensing incentives: when the licensee enters into the …nal goods market, licensing arises in equilibrium when …rms trade through a two-part tari¤ contract, but not when they trade through a wholesale price contract. And second, when input trading takes place through a wholesale price contract, the licensee's entry not only does not discourage vertical licensing, but, in fact, it constitutes its driving force.
(
ii) Ex-ante Monopoly
We have assumed throughout our analysis that there are initially two vertically integrated incumbents in the market. One might wonder whether this assumption is innocuous. In order to examine this, we consider here the alternative case in which only …rm 1 is initially in the market -it is an ex-ante monopolist.
In the no entry case now, the licensee, in contrast to our main analysis, does not subsidize the production of …rm 1. This occurs because …rm 1 does not face any competition, and thus, …rm S has no reason to increase its aggressiveness in the …nal goods market. An implication of this is that …rm 1 and …rm S operate as a vertically integrated …rm; hence, 2 4 If we included bargaining over w, the equilibrium wholesale prices would be lower than b w LN and b w LE . In fact, they would be decreasing with the bargaining power of …rm 1. Clearly, this means, that the licensing incentives in the entry case would not only be present but that they would be even stronger then. Moreover, …rm 1 again would not have licensing incentives in the no entry case. they operate as in the benchmark case of no licensing. This means that …rm 1 is now indi¤erent between licensing without entry and no licensing.
In the entry case, there are two important di¤erences relative to our main analysis. The …rst is that the competition intensity e¤ ect is stronger because …rm S's entry into the …nal goods market transforms the latter from a monopoly to a duopoly. The second is that the business stealing e¤ ect is absent since …rm 2 does not exist in the …nal goods market. In light of these, one would expect that …rm 1 does not opt for licensing now. This is not so though; …rm 1 opts for licensing even when licensing causes the loss of its monopoly status.
Proposition 8 When …rm 1 is initially a monopolist in the market, it has incentives to license its input technology if …rm S enters into the …nal goods market. Otherwise, it is indi¤ erent between licensing and no licensing.
The presence of licensing incentives, which is more striking here than in our main analysis, is driven exclusively by the market expansion e¤ ect and, thus, by the positive impact that entry has on the size of the …nal goods market. Furthermore, the market expansion e¤ ect is also the driving force for the positive impact that licensing under entry has on both the consumer and total welfare. Summing up, the market structure can in ‡uence the licensing incentives: when licensing does not trigger entry, licensing is more likely to occur when the licensor is not a monopolist. In addition, the entry of the licensee into the licensor's market encourages instead of discourages the licensing incentives even though the licensor seizes to be monopolist.
(iii) Cost Asymmetry
We have assumed throughout our analysis that the two incumbents are symmetric. One might wonder what would happen if the two …rms had asymmetric costs, and in particular, if the licensor had a cost advantage relative to the other incumbent.
In order to examine this, we assume now that the marginal costs that …rm 1 and …rm 2 face initially are, respectively, c and c 2 , with c < c 2 . Under this assumption, we …nd that the results of our main model are qualitatively similar. Moreover, we …nd that the licensing incentives, both under entry and no entry, are stronger when the licensor enjoys a cost-advantage than when it does not as well as that the positive impact of licensing on consumer and total welfare is larger in the former case. This occurs because when the licensor enjoys a cost advantage, then both the input pricing e¤ ect and the market expansion e¤ ect are stronger while the competition intensity e¤ ect is weaker.
(iv) Bargaining over the Licensing Fee
In our main model, the licensor makes a take-it-or-leave-it o¤er over the …xed licensing fee.
We consider here what would happen if the licensor bargained with the licensee not only over the input's trading terms but also over the licensing fee. To do so, we assume that the …rms bargain in a Nash bargaining fashion in the …rst stage of the game over F and that they bargaining powers are the same as the ones in their negotiations over the input's terms of trade.
When the bargaining power of …rm S is positive, …rm 1 is not in the position to extract all of …rm S's pro…ts through F . Still, even in this case, …rm 1 always has incentives to license its input technology both with and without entry. This holds because during the negotiations over F , …rm S has to compensate …rm 1 for the pro…ts that the latter makes without licensing -otherwise, …rm 1 would not o¤er a licensing agreement to …rm S and the latter would make zero pro…ts. Because of this, in the extreme case in which …rm 1 has no bargaining power ( = 1), it is indi¤erent among licensing and no licensing. In all other cases, it prefers licensing to no licensing and the higher is its bargaining power the more it prefers licensing.
The allocation of the licensing fee does not a¤ect consumer and total welfare. Therefore, the conclusions of our main analysis regarding the impact of licensing on them remain unchanged in the presence of bargaining.
(v) Licensing through Royalty
One might wonder what would happen if licensing took place though a per-unit of output royalty, r 0, instead of through a …xed licensing fee.
Clearly, when a royalty is used, …rm 1 is not able to extract all the potential pro…ts of the licensee. Moreover, …rm S's marginal cost is r + c instead of c. The increase in the input supplier's marginal cost can translate into worse input sourcing terms for …rm 1 and, thus, into lower …rm 1's pro…ts from its own sales in the …nal goods market. Not surprisingly thus, in the no entry case, …rm 1 always optimally sets r N = 0. Given this, does it have incentives to license its technology? The answer to this question is already provided in our main analysis. More speci…cally, recall that when F = 0, …rm 1 opts for licensing if and only if its bargaining power is su¢ ciently high and the licensee does not enter into the …nal goods market.
In the entry case, when the royalty is imposed only on …rm 1's output, then again r E = 0. But when it is imposed either only on …rm S's output or on both …rm S's and …rm 1's output, r E > 0. When the latter occurs, then, in contrast to what happens when licensing takes place through a …xed fee, the entry of the licensee into the …nal goods market discourages licensing incentives -licensing does not arise in equilibrium. This is so mainly for two reasons. First, because the market expansion e¤ ect is weaker when r E > 0. And second, because since now …rm 1 does not manage to extract …rm S's pro…ts, it is not in the position to take full advantage of the market expansion e¤ ect.
It follows from the above that the form of the licensing contract, whether it is a …xed licensing fee or a variable royalty, can a¤ect the licensing incentives. It also follows that when licensing is through a royalty, entry can discourage instead of encourage licensing. This is in sharp contrast with our main conclusion. Still, we should mention that …rm 1 is better o¤ under licensing through a …xed licensing fee than under licensing through a royalty; …rm 1 would choose to license its technology through a …xed licensing fee and not through a royalty. Actually, …rm 1's choice would be aligned with the interest of consumers and the economy as a whole since the positive impact of licensing on consumer and total welfare is even larger when licensing takes place through a …xed licensing fee rather than through a royalty. Stated di¤erently, not only from the licensor's viewpoint but also from a welfare viewpoint, vertical licensing is preferable when it occurs through a …xed licensing fee.
(vi) Downstream Price Competition
Next, we discuss what happens if the …rms compete in prices in the …nal products market instead of in quantities.
As it is well known from the literature, prices, in contrast to quantities, are strategic complements. Because of this, under downstream price competition, in the no entry case, …rm S does not subsidize …rm 1's …nal production via the wholesale price; it does not wish its downstream partner to behave aggressively in the …nal market competition -it charges a wholesale price that exceeds its marginal cost. Still, similarly to our main model, …rm 1 always has incentives to license its input technology. In fact, it has again incentives to license its technology even for free if the bargaining power of …rm S is low enough. Why is that? As the literature on vertical separation (e.g., Bonanno and Vickers, 1988 , Lin, 1988 , Gal-Or, 1990 , Cyrenne, 1994 has demonstrated, vertical separation (vertical licensing in our case) dampens downstream competition, leading to higher downstream pro…ts that the upstream …rm (the downstream …rm in our case) extracts through the …xed fee.
In the entry case now, …rm 1 has incentives to license its input technology, but not always.
It has incentives to do so if and only if the …nal products are not too close substitutes (if and only if < 0:9793). Its licensing incentives are driven now by the market expansion e¤ ect alone; the business stealing e¤ ect is absent under price competition. Moreover, competition in the market is …ercer under price competition than under quantity competition. Hence, the competition intensity e¤ ect of licensing is stronger in the former case and dominates its market expansion e¤ ect when products tend to be homogeneous since then downstream competition is already quite …erce. Clearly, this implies that in markets in which …rms' products are quite similar, vertical licensing, when it is accompanied by entry, is more likely to be observed when …rms compete in quantities than when they compete in prices.
It follows that the impact of entry on the licensing incentives is positive under downstream price competition too, but only as long as the …nal products are not too close substitutes (in particular, if and only if < 0:8801). Licensing continues to be welfareenhancing under downstream price competition but only when it triggers entry. In the no entry case, licensing is now welfare detrimental due to the decrease that it causes (through the input price) in the licensor's e¢ ciency.
Concluding Remarks
We have examined the incentives of a vertically integrated incumbent to license its input technology to an external …rm. We have done so in a setting in which after the signing of the licensing agreement, the licensor sources the input from the licensee and the latter can enter into the …nal goods market and compete with the licensor.
We have shown that licensing emerges in equilibrium not only when the licensee does not enter into direct competition with the licensor, but also when it enters. In fact, we have shown that in the latter case, although market competition is more intense, the licensing incentives are stronger. Intuitively, in the absence of entry, vertical licensing is motivated by the low input price at which the licensor sources the input from the licensee. The low input price translates into higher e¢ ciency and, thus, into larger market share and pro…ts for the licensor.
When, instead, the licensee enters into the …nal goods market, …rst, the licensor is less e¢ cient -it pays a high input price -and second, it competes with more …rms than in the no licensing case. Still, the licensor opts for licensing because the entry of the licensee results in the expansion of the …nal goods market and in business stealing from the rival incumbent …rm. The licensor takes full advantage of these e¤ects by extracting the resulting pro…ts of the licensee through the licensing fee. So, the entry of the licensee encourages instead of discourages the licensing incentives even when licensing intensi…es market competition.
Our welfare analysis has revealed, …rst, that vertical licensing is always bene…cial both for the consumers and for the economy as a whole, and second, that it is even more bene…cial in the entry case. In particular, it indicates that vertical licensing, by triggering entry into more than one stages of a vertical chain, it can also generate more intense product market competition.
Extending our main analysis in various directions, we have shown that in many instances the emergence of licensing in equilibrium would be impossible without the entry of the licensee in the …nal goods market. This is, for instance, the case when the licensor and the licensee trade via a wholesale price contract or when the licensor is initially the only …rm in the market. Moreover, the entry of the licensee reinforces licensing incentives even when the rival …rm sources its input by the same supplier as well as when downstream competition takes place in prices. However, the entry of the licensee seems to obstruct licensing when the latter takes place through royalties.
Summing up, we have provided an explanation for the commonly observed practice of vertical licensing in markets where licensing can transform the licensee from an input supplier to a direct competitor of the licensor. Our explanation lies on strategic considerations and not on exogenously assumed e¢ ciencies of the licensee. Clearly, if we had assumed that the licensee is either more e¢ cient in input production than the licensor or that the input production is characterized by economies of scale, then vertical licensing and the positive impact of entry on the licensing incentives would have been much less surprising than in our setting.
Still, we should mention that our analysis is just a …rst step in the direction of understanding licensing in vertically related markets. In future work, we plan to extend our analysis by endogenizing …rms' investments in their input production technology and examining how they could a¤ect the licensing incentives.
8 Appendix A 
Common Input Supplier (a) No Entry
After each …rm i chooses its quantity in order to maximize its pro…ts: i (q i ; q j ; w i ) = (a q i q j )q i w i q i with i; j = 1; 2 and i 6 = j, we obtain the equilibrium quantities for given levels of input prices:
Letting w CN j denote the equilibrium outcome of the negotiations of …rm S and …rm j, w i is chosen to maximize the generalized Nash bargaining product:
where
Note that …rm S's pro…ts arise from sales to two instead of one …nal good producer. We notice here that …rm S has an outside option, which means that its disagreement payo¤ is no longer null. In particular, if an agreement between …rm S and …rm i is not reached, then …rm S's disagreement payo¤ is given by
is the quantity expected to be produced by the monopolist …nal good producer which faces an input price w CN j . In other words, in case of disagreement with one of the …nal good producers, …rm S is expected to receive from the remaining …rm in the …nal goods market the equilibrium …xed fee T CN j plus the revenues from input sales at the equilibrium wholesale price w CN j . From the …rst order conditions of (18) we obtain the equilibrium wholesale price and the respective net equilibrium pro…ts:
(b) Entry
After each …rm i chooses its quantity in order to maximize its pro…ts: i (q i ; q j ; q S ; w i ; w j ) = (a q i q j q S )q i w i q i , with i; j = 1; 2 and i 6 = j, while …rm S chooses its quantity in order to maximize its pro…ts given by: S (q i ; q j ; q S ; w i ; w j ) = (a q S q i q j )q S c(q i + q j + q S ) + w i q i + w j q j , we obtain the equilibrium quantities for given levels of input prices:
q S (w i ; w j ) = a(2 ) (2 + )c + (
Letting w CE j denote the equilibrium outcome of the negotiations of …rm S and …rm j, w i is chosen to maximize the generalized Nash bargaining product:
where S (w i ; w CE j ) and i (w i ; w CE j ) are found after substituting q S (w i ; w j ) and q i (w i ; w j ) into S (q i ; q j ; q S ; w i ; w j ) and i (q i ; q j ; q S ; w i ; w j ). In the entry case …rm S has an outside option that di¤ers to the one of the no entry case. In particular, if an agreement between …rm S and …rm i is not reached, then …rm S's disagreement payo¤ is given by
are the quantities expected to be produced, respectively, by …rm S and …rm j which faces an input price w CE j . In other words, in case of disagreement with …rm i, …rm S can still have pro…ts from its own sales in the …nal goods market, as well as it receives the equilibrium …xed fee T CE j plus the revenues from input sales at the equilibrium wholesale price w CE j from the rival remaining …rm in the …nal goods market.
From the …rst order conditions of (24) we obtain the equilibrium wholesale price and the respective net equilibrium pro…ts:
where A = 32 + 16 + 80 + 16 + 64 2 16 2 + 8 3 8 3 10 4 + 7 4 5 + 5 > 0.
9 Appendix B Proof of Proposition 1: Calculating the di¤erence in the pro…ts of …rm 1 in the case of licensing and no entry and in the benchmark case, we …nd:
Thus, …rm 1 always has incentives to license its input technology under no entry.
Proof of Corollary 1: Calculating the di¤erence in the pro…ts of …rm 1 in the case of licensing and no entry without receiving the licensing fee, and in the benchmark case, we …nd
> 0 if and only if 0 < < 4 16 8 2 + 4 . Thus, under no entry …rm 1 has incentives to license its input technology for free when its bargaining power is su¢ ciently high.
Proof of Proposition 2:
Calculating the di¤erence in the pro…ts of …rm 1 in the case of licensing and entry and in the benchmark case, we …nd:
Therefore, …rm 1 always has incentives to license its input technology under entry.
Proof of Proposition 3:
Calculating the di¤erence in the pro…ts of …rm 1 in the case of licensing with entry and in the case of licensing without entry,we …nd:
It follows that …rm 1 has stronger incentives to license its input technology with entry than without entry.
Proof of Proposition 4:
We di¤erentiate ( LN 1 B 1 ) and ( LE 1 B 1 ) in terms of , respectively: It follows that an increase in product di¤erentiation has a negative impact on the licensing incentives under no entry and a positive one under entry.
Proof of Proposition 5:
In the benchmark case, the consumers'surplus is:
In the case of licensing with no entry, the consumers'surplus is:
In the case of licensing with entry, the consumers'surplus is: , we …nd that they are always positive.
Total welfare is de…ned as the sum of consumers'and producers'surplus, namely: + 17 8 + 3 9 > 0, we …nd that they are always positive and, therefore, both consumers'surplus and total welfare are greater with entry than without entry.
Proof of Proposition 6:
(i): In the Common Input Supplier case, calculating the di¤erence in the pro…ts of …rm 1 in the case of licensing without entry and in the benchmark case, we …nd: Therefore, …rm 1 always has incentives to license its input technology under entry.
(iii): In the Common Input Supplier case, calculating the di¤erence in the pro…ts of …rm 1 in the case of licensing with entry and in the case of licensing without entry,we …nd: , we …nd that they are always positive.
Total welfare is de…ned as the sum of consumers and producers'surplus, namely: 
Proof of Corollary 2:
(i): Calculating the di¤erence in the pro…ts of …rm 1 in the case of licensing and no entry when …rm 1 and …rm 2 source the input from …rm S with the case when only …rm 1 sources the input from …rm S, we …nd that, CN Therefore, …rm 1 has always incentives to license its input technology under entry.
Calculating the di¤erence in the pro…ts of …rm 1 in the case of licensing without entry and in the benchmark case, we observe that e LN 1 e B 1 = 0, namely, …rm 1 is indi¤erent between licensing without entry and no licensing.
